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A patent holder owning a two-period lasting innovation is unable to push it into the 
market, so it is licensed to a downstream user with production capabilities to market it. 
The production cost of this firm can be low or high, but the patent holder has only a prior 
on this fact. To discover the patent value, it may design a separating or a signaling 
short-run licensing contract. In the first case, the contract of period 1 includes a fixed fee 
for the efficient user and a two-part contract for the inefficient user; in the second, it 
consists of a fixed fee alone for both types of user. From the patent holder's viewpoint, a 
screening contract is better than a signaling contract only when the user is likely to 
become inefficient in marketing the innovation and the cost difference is not very high. 
Otherwise, a signaling contract is preferred. Hence, the coexistence of the different 
licensing schemes observed in practice can be rationalized by the use of different 
devices (screening or signaling) aimed at alleviating the effects of opportunistic 
behavior. From a social perspective, although screening is generally superior to 
signaling to extract hidden information—signaling is preferred to screening under certain 
conditions. 
 
Keywords: Licensing, asymmetric information, screening, signaling
 





                                                 
* I wish to thank an anonymous referee for many helpful comments and suggestions that greatly improved 
this article. Thanks are also due to Roberto Burguet, Miguel Pérez-Nievas and Antonio R. Sampayo for 
their contributions. Financial aid received from the Xunta de Galicia through project INCITE09201042PR 
is gratefully acknowledged. 
** Departamento de Fundamentos da Análise Económica, Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, 
































Patent licensing is one of the most relevant methods of technology transfer 
between firms and also a significant revenue source for both independent and 
inside patent holders (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Arora and Fosfuri, 2002). 
Theoretical and empirical work on the optimal form of licensing contracts is vast. 
Findings show that, in a complete information context, fee contracts are better 
(worse) than royalty contracts when the patent holder is outside (inside) the 
industry (Kamien and Tauman, 1986; Katz and Shapiro, 1985, 1986; Kamien et 
al., 1992; Sen, 2005; Sen and Tauman, 2007). Contrariwise, double-sided 
moral hazard problems and optimal risk allocation justify the existence of two-
part (fee plus royalty) contracts (Poddar and Sinha, 2002; Beggs, 1992; Gallini 
and Wright, 1990; Choi, 2001; Viswasrao, 2007; Cebrián, 2009). 
This paper tackles a relevant issue to understand optimal structure of 
licensing contracts in the presence of asymmetric information. Unlike standard 
literature on licensing under asymmetric information, where a fixed set up is 
established to disclose private information (screening or signaling models), this 
paper compares the outcome of both of them for the patent holder and the 
society as a whole. In particular, this research sheds light on how the choice 
among different licensing schemes is carried out to mitigate opportunistic 
behavior. In other words, it shows the impact which adverse selection may have 
on the form of payment in licensing arrangements when the patent holder 
licenses the innovation to a firm with production capacity to market it.  
In the model, the (upstream) patent holder owns a patented innovation for 
two time periods but has no production capabilities to market it by itself, thus 





























unaware of the efficiency level of the innovation user (the value of the 
innovation), but only knows for sure that production cost may adopt a certain 
value (low or high) according to a given probability. To infer true cost, the patent 
holder may offer the licensee a separating contract (i.e., screening) or allow the 
licensee signaling its type (i.e., signaling). To this end, the licensing process 
between an upstream patent holder and a downstream licensee is examined 
within a two-period model. In the model, only short-term (fixed-fee and royalty) 
contracts are allowed. That is, the patent holder neither solves a unique inter-
temporal optimization problem nor determines the whole vector of payments for 
the expected patent-lifetime by considering the inter-temporal participation and 
incentive constraints of the firm. Such a contractual structure may be based on 
the assumption of limited liability constraints, which lead the innovation user to 
obtain non-negative profits in any period and any realization of production costs 
when marketing the innovation.
1 
In the licensing-screening game, the patent holder offers in period 1 a 
menu of contracts and the licensee chooses a particular contract from the 
offered menu. Information becomes complete in period 2. On the other hand, in 
the licensing-signaling game, the patent holder offers the same contract to both 
types of licensee in period 1 and it is the licensee who discloses its private 
information through the publicly-observable output level of period 1. Thus, 
period 2 also becomes a complete information period as in the licensing-
screening game. 
                                                 
1 A well-known result in repeated agency models is that a long-term contract always dominates (at least weakly) a 
short-term contract. Thus, without considering limited liability constraints, a optimization problem in which the 
principal considers the inter-temporal participation constraint of the firm would dominate (from the principal's 





























In this context, the main goal of this paper is comparing the equilibrium 
outcome of the screening and signaling games to analyze the optimal method—
both for the patent holder and the society as a whole—in order to extract hidden 
information. In other words, what optimal licensing-contract structure allows the 
patent holder and the society restoring complete information at the lowest cost? 
This novel approach sharply differs from others previously used in specialized 
literature, since it compares different information-revelation schemes instead of 
adopting a given framework of information revelation (identification/screening or 
signaling). 
Three main conclusions can be drawn from analysis: Firstly, if the patent 
holder offers a separating contract, the optimum contract in period 1 includes a 
fixed fee aimed at the efficient firm and a fixed-fee-plus-royalty combination 
aimed at the inefficient firm. The former firm does not distort its production level, 
while the latter firm distorts its production level downward due to the higher 
marginal cost imposed by the royalty. However, if the patent holder allows the 
firm signaling its type, there is then a separating equilibrium in which the 
optimum contract in period 1 consists on a fixed-fee for both firm types. The 
inefficient firm does not distort its production level, while the inefficient firm 
distorts its production level downward to signal its inefficiency and thus pay a 
lower fee in period 2. This finding then confirms that, under adverse selection, 
optimal licensing contracts do not adopt one only form but may include a 
different payment structure depending on model parametric configuration. 
Particularly, fee-plus-royalty (in the screening variant of the licensing game) or 






























Secondly, from the patent holder's viewpoint, a menu of contracts in period 
1 is better than a signaling contract, but only when the firm is likely to become 
inefficient to market the innovation and the difference in production costs is low 
enough. In this case, a screening contract leads the inefficient firm to lower 
production distortion than with a signaling contract. Thus, the expected income 
of the patent holder increases. Under any other circumstances, the patent 
holder prefers a signaling contract to a menu of contracts, since signaling 
involves little cost. This is relevant to understand how asymmetric information 
accounts for the different payment types observed in licensing contracts. Both 
screening and signaling lead the inefficient firm to downward production-level 
distortion in period 1; however, the source of this distortion differs from one 
case to another. Under a screening contract, distortion is exogenous due to the 
increased cost of the inefficient firm, attributable to the royalty imposed by the 
patent holder. However, under a signaling contract, distortion at the production 
level of the inefficient user is endogenous, since this firm signaled itself as such 
in period 1 so as to pay a lower fee later on. 
Thirdly, from a social perspective, within most of the space defined by the 
probability of becoming an efficient user and production cost difference, 
screening the efficiency level of the licensee creates greater expected total 
welfare than a signaling contract. Under either screening or signaling, the 
amount produced in period 1 by the efficient user is not distorted as compared 
to the profit-maximizing quantity. However, the output of the inefficient licensee 
is distorted downward as compared to the profit-maximizing amount. Although 
distortion under a signaling contract may be lower than under a screening 





























patent holder's income) and consumer surplus in period 1. Distortion due to a 
screening contract, however, causes (a welfare loss but, especially) welfare re-
distribution: it reduces the patent holder's income and the consumer surplus in 
period 1, but allows the efficient licensee to obtain informational rents in such 
period. Thus, when not only the patent holder is considered but also innovation 
consumers and users, a screening contract is generally superior (except when 
high enough values of the probability of being an efficient innovation user are 
coupled to a large enough difference in production costs). In this case, signaling 
cost is so little relative to screening cost that the former is advantageous to the 
patent holder and the society as a whole. This means that—both in this small 
region and in the region where screening is optimal for the patent holder—
private and social incentives are aligned. 
To sum up, this paper comprises both a positive aspect, explaining the 
different contractual arrangements observed in real licensing contracts (fee-only 
payments as well as fee-plus-royalty combinations), and a normative aspect, 
examining the welfare implications of different licensing schemes. 
The rest of this paper is structured into four sections: Section 2 includes 
model description, Section 3 develops a licensing-screening and a licensing-
signaling equilibriums, and Section 4 compares both equilibriums from the 
perspective of the patent holder and the society as a whole, while conclusions 
are drawn in Section 5. Proofs are reported in the Appendix. 
 
2. The model 
 
Consider an upstream patent holder lacking of production capacity which owns 





























(t=1,2). This innovation is launched by a downstream firm which produces a 
new good. Demand for this good is given by 
t t t q q p − =1 ) ( ,        ( 1 )  
in each period t, where pt stands for the unit price in t when production level is 
qt. Both the patent holder and the licensee have complete information on the 
demand given in (1).  
The licensee faces a linear cost function  t t t q c q c ~ ) ( =  in each period, where 
c ~  is the marginal (and average) production cost in innovation marketing. The 
firm's cost is given and privately known by the firm, and the patent holder does 
not know such cost. However, it is common knowledge that the cost of the 
licensee is independent, drawn from a probability distribution that assigns 
probability  μ, 0<μ<1 to low-cost production (zero cost, for simplicity) and 
probability 1-μ to high-cost level c, c>0. For the sake of regularity, the following 
property is assumed: 
 
Assumption 1. Parameters μ and c are so that  1 < +c μ  
 
This assumption ensures that, if the licensee becomes inefficient to market the 
innovation, it will always produce a positive amount of output in the first period 
(of the licensing-screening game). Hence, it defines the (μ,c)-region of 
parameters where the equilibrium of such a game involves that the licensee is 
active in the industry, regardless of its cost type. 
Finally, there is no discount factor between periods and both the patent 
holder and the licensee are risk-neutral players. Contracts in each production 





























paper, we look for the separating equilibrium in both screening and signaling 
games.  
 
3. Equilibrium analysis 
 
3.1 First best 
If the patent holder owns the same information as the innovation user, the 




) , ( kt kt kt kt t r F r q r F
kt kt
⋅ + = Π       ( 2 )  
for each type k, k=L,H, of licensee in each period t, t=1,2.
2 Given that royalty 
rates distort the licensee's production through increased marginal cost—they 
lead to a lower overall surplus to be shared by the licensee and the patent 
holder (Kamien and Tauman, 1984, 1986; Kamien et al., 1992; Poddar and 
Sinha, 2002). Therefore, the optimal licensing strategy in each period is to 
charge only a fixed fee, so the licensee receives its reservation payoff (zero). 
Hence,  4 ) ~ 1 (
2 c Fkt − =  is the short-term contract and the patentee obtains the 
whole profits of each type. This result can be recorded in the following lemma, 
where subscripts L and H denote low- and high-cost firm, respectively. 
 
Lemma 1. The first-best licensing contract is a fee contract:  4 1 = Lt F  if the firm is 
efficient and  4 ) 1 (
2 c FHt − =  if inefficient; there is no royalty rate,  0 = = Lt Lt r r . 
 
3.2 The licensing-screening game  
                                                 





























In the licensing-screening game, in period 1 the patent holder screens each 
type of licensee by offering a menu of contracts (screening contract), each 
charging a fee and a per-unit royalty. The licensee then chooses a particular 
contract from the menu and the patent holder infers the cost of the licensee. 
Thus, in period 2, types are observable because the principal observes the 
contract accepted in the previous period. Consequently, information becomes 
complete in period 2.
3  
I only consider short-term licensing contracts. That is, the principal (the 
patent holder) neither solves a unique inter-temporal optimization problem nor 
determines the whole payment vector for the entire patent lifetime (two periods) 
by considering the inter-temporal participation and incentive constraints of the 
firm. This contractual structure is based on the assumption of the limited liability 
constraints which lead the agent (the innovation user) to have non-negative 
profits in any period and production-cost realization. Without this assumption, 
an optimization program in which the principal would consider the inter-temporal 
participation constraint of the agent would obviously be dominant from the 
principal's viewpoint. 
Let  )} , ( ), , {( 1 1 1 1 H H L L r F r F  denote the menu of contracts offered to the licensee 
in period 1, thus under asymmetric information. The first contract from the 
menu,  ) , ( 1 1 L L r F , is aimed at the low-cost firm and the second,  ) , ( 1 1 H H r F , at the 
high-cost firm. Such a menu must solve the patent holder’s problem 
)] ( [ ) 1 ( )] ( [ max 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
PH
1 ) , ( 1 1
H H H H L L L L r r r q r F r q r F
H L
⋅ + − + ⋅ + = μ μ Π     (3) 
subject to 
                                                 













































































































+ − .     (7) 
Therefore, the licensee chooses a particular contract from the menu. Conditions 
(4) and (5) are the participation constraints for the efficient and inefficient firm, 
respectively. On the other hand, (6) and (7) represent the incentive compatibility 
conditions for the efficient and inefficient user, respectively. 
Obviously, contract (FL1,rL1), aimed at the efficient firm, must enable this 
firm to get (informational) rents in equilibrium. Since royalties distort production 
and surplus, a reduction in the amount of rL1 to zero and an increase in the 
corresponding fixed fee FL1 subjected to the fulfillment of condition (6) would 
increase the rents accrued by the patent holder. Furthermore, this adjustment 
does not violate condition (7). This enables that 







































− =                                                                (8) 
as the up-front fee aimed at the efficient firm. On the other hand, since (5) will 
be fulfilled as an equality, therefore,  4 ) 1 (
2
1 1 H H r c F − − = . The problem stated in 
(3)-(7) then becomes  




H H H H L r r q r F F
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= μ μ ,   (9) 
and its resolution leads to the following result: 






1  as the royalty rate aimed at the inefficient licensee. Besides,  0 1 = L r  
for the efficient licensee. 
 
Particularly,  0 1 = H r  in the limit case where  0 = μ  (i.e., the patent holder is aware 
of the licensee’s inefficiency). In this case, the contract offered to this 
(inefficient) user is reduced to a fixed fee equal to the entire surplus, as it should 
be under complete information. If  0 > μ , however, the royalty rate is positive and 
increases, both with μ, the probability of an efficient user in innovation 
marketing, and c, the marginal cost of production linked to a bad realization.
4 
Lemma 2 also states that when the patent holder offers the innovation 
under a separating contract, it is offered to both types of licensee, regardless of 
the patent holder's prior belief. In the equilibrium, the inefficient user is offered a 
contract formed by a mixture of a fixed fee, FH1 shown in Table 1, and a royalty 
rate rH1, stated in Lemma 2 and summarized in Table 1. The efficient user, on 
the other hand, is offered the fee-only contract FL1 shown in Table 1. 
          Table 1. Equilibrium values of the first period in the licensing-screening 
game 
c ~   1 r   1 F   1 q  
0 0 
) 1 ( 4
1 ) 2 ( ) 1 (
2 2 2
μ
μ μ μ μ μ
−
− + − − − + − c c
2
1  
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Under these circumstances, the expected revenue for the patent holder in 
period 1,  )] ( [ ) 1 ( 1 1 1 1 1
PH
scr H H H H L r q r F F ⋅ + − + = μ μ Π , amounts to:  
) 1 ( 4




μ μ μ μ μ
Π
−
− + − − − + −
=
c c ,      ( 1 0 )  













c c c       ( 1 1 )  
is the expected informational rent of the efficient licensee in period 1,
5 whereas 
it is  0
H
scr = Π  in case of an inefficient licensee. 
 
3.3 The licensing-signaling game 
 
In this case, at the beginning of period 1, the patent holder announces and 
commits itself to a fee F1 and a per-unit royalty r1 in exchange for innovation 
usage within this period. Contract (F1,r1) is the same for both licensee types, 
since the patent holder cannot distinguish between them in this period. The 
licensee accepts the offer and produces an output level q1 according to its type. 
The patent holder observes this output level and, in a separating equilibrium, 
can infer the licensee's type. Thus, the second-period game becomes a 
complete information game. In this period, the patent holder commits itself to a 
                                                 
5 Since μ<1-c implies μ(3+c)<3-c, this informational rent is positive in the entire region of parameters μ and c 





























new fixed fee F2, according to the licensee's type.
6 Finally, the licensee selects 
its period 2 output q2. 
 
3.3.1 Period 2 
In a separating equilibrium, the information gathered by the patent holder 
observing the firm's output in period 1 creates a complete-information game in 
period 2. So Lemma 1 still applies. 
Note that the efficient firm will pay a higher fee than the inefficient firm. The 
efficient firm will then try to be perceived as inefficient, regardless of its true 
cost. Analysis of whether a low-cost firm could advantageously conceal its costs 
in period 1 and whether the two-period game admits equilibriums in which the 
foreseeable actions of the patent holder and a high-cost firm force the low-cost 
licensee to reveal its costs
7 is followed by the examination of separating 
equilibriums. It is assumed that, for the patent holder in period 2, after observing 
q1, the period 1 licensee's production, the revised subjective probability of a 
licensee to be low-cost is zero if 
s
H q q 1 1 =  and unity otherwise, where 
s
H q 1 is the 
period 1 output of a high-cost licensee in the (separating) equilibrium of the two-
period signaling game.  
By comparing the firm's profits in period 2, when it reveals and 
misrepresents its type, the following result arises. 
 
Lemma 3. In the licensing-signaling game, the licensee is interested in being 
perceived as an inefficient innovation user. 
                                                 
6 Due to complete information in period 2, the contract offered in that period only consists on a fixed fee.  
7 It is easy to show that, in this signalling game, there are no pooling equilibriums of interest for the players. For such 
equilibrium, an incomplete information game would be the game played in period 2 (because period 1 enables no new 
information on licensees’ costs) and in period 1 (because playing an incomplete information game in period 2 means 
there is no reason not to maximize profits in period  1). But the incomplete information game does reveal the 






























Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
3.3.2 Period 1 
To pay a lower fee in period 2, an efficient firm misrepresents itself as inefficient 
(as stated in Lemma 3) by producing the output level of an inefficient firm. 
Consequently, the inefficient firm, to distinguish itself from the efficient one, may 
be forced to produce, in period 1, no more than it would in the absence of 
signaling. 
The period 2 net profit of the licensee when the patent holder believes its 
cost is x, while its true cost is y, is denoted by  ) | ( 2 y x π . Thus, the incentive 
compatibility condition for a low-cost licensee is 




L π π π π + ≥ + ,    (12) 
where 
m
L1 π  represents its period 1 profit as a simple monopolist and  ) ( 1 1
s
H L q π  its 
profit when it produces the output level of the inefficient firm. In turn, the 
incentive-compatibility condition for an inefficient licensee is 




H H π π π π + ≥ + ,         (13) 
where  ) ( 1 1
s
H H q π  denotes its period 1 profit when producing 
s
H q 1, the output 
showing its true type, and 
m
H1 π  represents its period 1 profit when it represents 
itself as a high-cost firm and then produces like a simple (and myopic) inefficient 
monopolist, thus being perceived as a low-cost licensee and paying fee FL2 in 
exchange for the innovation in period 2. Analysis of conditions (12) and (13) 
leads to the following result. 
 
Lemma 4. The unique separating equilibrium of minimum cost of the licensing-





























(i) In period 1, the outputs of the low- and high-cost firm are  2 1 1 =
s
L q  and 
2 ] ) 2 ( 1 [ 1 c c q
s
H − − = , respectively. The patent holder charges the fee 
4 )] ) 2 ( 2 4 ( ) 1 ( 1 [ 1 c c c c F
s − − − − − = μ  to both licensee types. There is no royalty 
payment. 
(ii) The patent holder’s subsequent beliefs are  1 ) | 0 ~ ( 1 1 = = =
s
L q q c Prob  and 
1 ) | ~ ( 1 1 = = =
s
H q q c c Prob  
(iii) In period 2, the outputs of the low- and high-cost firm are  2 1 2 = L q  and 
2 ) 1 ( 2 c qH − = , respectively. The patent holder sets the fee payment  4 1 2 = L F  to 
the low-cost licensee and  4 ) 1 (
2
2 c FH − =  to the high-cost one. 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
Given that complete information holds after the period 1, the best an efficient 
licensee can do in period 1 is simply producing the output which maximizes its 




L q q 1 1 = . However, the inefficient firm, to distinguish 
itself from the efficient one, needs to produce, under incomplete information, a 




H q q 1 1 < . Otherwise, its output 
would be mimicked by the efficient firm and a separating equilibrium would not 
hold. That is, signaling is costly in the entire (μ,c)-parameter space defined by 
Assumption 1, since it leads to distorted production in the high-cost licensee 
and, consequently, in the patent holder's incomes.  
Another important feature is that, once again, royalties distort the 
licensee's behavior in period 1, so their inclusion in licensing contracts is 





























fee-only contract under asymmetric information (Antelo, 2009). Table 2 shows a 
list of the values of the period 1 equilibrium of this game. 
 
          Table 2. Equilibrium values of the first period in the licensing-signaling 
game 











1 ] ) 2 ( 2 4 )[ 1 ( ) 1 (
2 + − − − − − c c c c μ μ
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) 2 ( 1 c c − −
 
 
To sum up, the (expected) licensing revenue accrued by the patent holder 
in period 1 amounts to: 
 
4
] ) 2 ( 1 ][ ) 2 ( 2 1 )[ 1 ( PH
sig
c c c c c − − − + − − +
=
μ μ
Π ,    (14) 
where subscript "sig" denotes a signaling contract. 
 
4. Screening vs. signaling  
 
4.1 The patent holder 
Comparison of the patent holder's revenue given in (10) and (14) renders the 
following result: 
 
Proposition 1. A screening contract provides the patentee with more licensing 





























0 ] ) 2 ( 8 14 [ 9 ) 2 ( 4 7 ] ) 2 ( 2 5 [ 2 < − − − − + − + + − − − c c c c c c c c c μ .  Otherwise, a 
signaling contract is better for the patent holder. 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
That is, a screening contract is better than a signaling contract only when both 
the parameter μ, the probability of an efficient firm exploiting the innovation, is 
below 0.4 and the parameter c, the size of the realization of high production 
cost, is low enough. Otherwise, if  4 . 0 < μ  and c is high enough or  4 . 0 > μ , 
regardless of the value adopted by parameter c, then a signaling contract allows 
the patent holder obtaining higher revenue than a screening contract. Figure 1, 
where the line plots the (μ,c)-locus defined by the condition in Proposition 1 as 
an equality, illustrates in the (μ,c)-parameter space the result of Proposition 1. 
 
Figure 1. The patent holder's optimal form to obtain information 
Screening Signaling
































The explanation of this result is quite simple. In period 1, the efficient innovation 





























both cases, its production level is not distorted as compared to the profit-
maximizing amount. The inefficient firm, however, under-produces in period 1 
as compared to its profit-maximizing level. In the licensing-signaling game, the 
cause of under-production is endogenous: the inefficient firm tries to distinguish 
itself from the efficient firm and represents itself as inefficient, since the 
behaviour allows it paying a lower fee in period 2. Such productive distortion 







q q q H H
− −
= − ≡ ∇ . 
In the licensing-screening game, however, the cause of downward 
distortion on the inefficient firm's production is exogenous: the presence of a 
royalty rate in the licensing contract which increases the firm's marginal 
production cost. This under-production, as compared to the profit-maximizing 






= − ≡ ∇ , being highly remarkable if μ >0.4 
or  μ <0.4, but c is large. In both cases, screening involves greater distortion on 
the inefficient firm's output than signaling. This fact reduces its profits under 
screening more than under signaling. Thus, the patent holder prefers a 
signaling to a screening contract. 
 
4.2 Welfare considerations 
 
To compare the outcomes of the screening and licensing games from a social 
perspective, expected aggregate welfare in period t is defined as the sum of 
expected consumer surplus, expected revenue for the patent holder, and 
expected profit for the licensee; namely 
L PH
t t t t CS W π Π + + = , where superscripts 





























Since both licensing games produce, in equilibrium, the same welfare level in 
period 2, comparison between them can be restricted to period 1. In the 



















μ                      (15) 
and in the signaling game to 
] ) 2 ( ) 1 )( 1 2 ( 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 6 3 [
8
1 2
sig c c c c c W − − − + − + − − = μ μ μ .   (16) 
Thus, the following result can be stated accordingly: 
 
Proposition 2. From a social perspective, a screening contract is superior to a 
signaling contract, except for parameters μ  and c fulfilling 
2
2
) 1 ( 1





> c ; then, a 
signaling contract creates greater welfare. 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
From a social viewpoint, a screening or separating contract is superior to a 
signaling contract in almost all the (μ,c)-region  R  of parameters defined by 
Assumption 1. The explanation is as follows. Under either screening or 
signaling the amount produced in period 1 by the efficient licensee is not 
distorted as compared to the profit-maximizing amount. Contrariwise, the output 
of the inefficient licensee is distorted downward as compared to the profit-
maximizing amount. Although the distortion under a signaling contract may be 
lower than under a screening contract (see Proposition 1), the former motivates 
a welfare loss, since both the firm's profit (or the patent holder’s licensing 
income) and consumer surplus in period 1 decrease. Distortion due to a 





























distribution: it reduces the patent holder's income and consumer surplus in 
period 1, but allows the efficient firm obtaining informational rents in this period. 
Thus, from a social viewpoint (not only the patent holder but also consumers 
and the innovation user are considered), a screening contract is generally 
superior. 









) 1 ( 1
) 1 ( 2
2
2
c ,       ( 1 7 )  
in which the output distortion of the inefficient licensee is more pronounced 
under screening than under signaling. Consequently, informational rents for the 
efficiency licensee decrease to the point that the expected social welfare is 
lower under a screening than a signaling contract. 
The result of Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 2, where the dashed line 
plots the (μ,c)-locus which separates the region where the patent holder prefers 
a signaling contract and that where a screening contract is preferred. The solid 
line, on the other hand, plots the condition defined by  0 ] ) 1 ( 1 [ ) 1 ( 2
2 2 = − + − − μ μ c  
and separates the (μ,c)-region, where a separating contract is socially optimal, 
from the (μ,c)-region, where a signaling contract is socially preferable. 
 





























Screening is socially efficient
Signaling is socially efficient
































Comparison of Propositions 1 and 2 allows us concluding that when the patent 
holder either screens the licensee or induces signaling and the parameter cost c 




This paper studies licensing from a patent holder, which has no manufacturing 
capacity for innovation exploitation, to a firm able to market the innovation. The 
patent lasts for two periods and the potential user disposes of private 
information on the market value of such innovation and thus give rise to 
opportunism problems. To alleviate the adverse selection problem, the patent 
holder may offer a separating contract which leads the licensee to disclose its 
production costs (i.e., screening) or may allow the user signaling itself through 
the produced output (i.e., signaling). Two agents—the patent holder and the 
buyer of the patent—interact in this two-period model. The market demand for 
final product is common knowledge, but both agents have different information 





























known by the firm, it remains unknown for the patent holder. Furthermore, both 
players are risk-neutral and there is no discount factor.  
In this context, if the patent holder chooses a (screening) separating 
contract to sell the innovation, the optimal menu of contracts in period 1 
consists on a fixed fee for the efficient innovation user and a two-part tariff for 
the inefficient user. The efficient firm does not distort its production level as 
compared to the profit-maximizing amount. However, the inefficient firm 
produces less than the corresponding profit-maximizing level due to the 
increased production cost caused by the imposed royalty. If, on the other hand, 
the patent holder licenses the innovation by allowing the licensee signaling its 
cost through the produced amount in period 1, there is a unique separating 
equilibrium in which the period 1 contract is formed by the same fixed fee for 
both firm types. In this case, the firm which becomes efficient in marketing the 
innovation does not distort its production in period 1, but the inefficient user 
strategically reduces its production level so as to represent itself as inefficient 
and thus pay a lower fee in period 2.  
Comparison of screening and signaling contracts suggests that the patent 
holder finds more profitable to offer a screening contract if the firm is likely to be 
inefficient, but the difference in production costs between the efficient and 
inefficient firm is not very large. In this case, signaling involves little cost. 
Otherwise (i.e., when the firm is very likely to become inefficient and the 
difference in production costs is very high, or when the firm is very likely to 
become efficient regardless of cost difference), a signaling contract is then 
better than a screening contract. For the licensee, in turn, a screening contract 





























screening game. Finally, consumers generally prefer screening to signaling. 
There is, however, a little region of parameters defined by a sufficiently large 
difference in costs where a signaling contract increases consumers' utility 
relative to a screening contract. 
From a social viewpoint, a screening contract is generally superior to a 
signaling contract to sell the innovation, except for a little region of parameters, 
since signaling involves lower social loss. The intuition of this result relies on the 
fact that the efficient innovation user obtains some informational rents under a 
screening contract, but not under a signaling contract. Moreover, the more likely 
the firm is to become efficient and the higher production cost difference is, the 
higher the magnitude of such rents is. This finding allows concluding that social 
preferences are not always aligned with the licensor opinion. 
Some model assumptions could be easily removed to examine the 
robustness of the results. For instance, the consideration of a discount factor 
different than one allows concluding that the region in which the patent holder 
prefers a signaling contract increases when compared to the case of no 
discount factor. Thus, a signaling contract is more likely to emerge in licensing 
schemes as interest rates increase, since signaling cost decreases with 
discount factor. Hence, the patent holder would never resort to a screening 
contract to sell the innovation for a sufficiently high discount.
8 The model could 
be also examined in the light of risk aversion or the consideration of more than 
one firm as potential licensees of the innovation so as to assess the robustness 
of the results. These issues remain for future research. 
 
                                                 































Proof of Lemma 3: Since complete information characterizes period 2, the 
optimal licensing contract for this period is a fee-only contract.  Denoted by 
) | ( 2 y x π , the period 2 net profit of the licensee if the patent holder believes its 
cost was x but really was y. Thus, if x=c, but y=0, in period 2 the patent holder 
offers the fee-alone contract given by  4 ) 1 (
2
2 c FH − = . Consequently, the net 
profit of the licensee amounts to:  2 2 2 0) | 0 ( ) 0 | ( H F c − =π π 4 ) 2 ( c c − = . A similar 
reasoning shows that:  2 2 2 ) | ( ) | 0 ( L F c c c − =π π 4 ) 2 ( c c − − = . Comparison of profit 
) 0 | ( 2 c π  with  0 ) 0 | 0 ( 2 = π , and profit  ) | 0 ( 2 c π  with  0 ) | ( 2 = c c π  shows that 
) 0 | 0 ( ) 0 | ( 2 2 π π > c  and  ) | ( ) | 0 ( 2 2 c c c π π < . This proves the result of the lemma. 
 
Proof of Lemma 4: The best a low-cost firm can do, in the separating 











= = ,       ( A 1 )  
where superscripts s and m stand for signaling and monopoly regimes, 
respectively, and r1 is the royalty rate imposed by the patent holder. On the 
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≥ − − − ,    (A3) 
which are simultaneously fulfilled by any output  ] , [
_ _
1 b a q
s
H ∈ , where a
- and b
- are 
the smaller roots of the quadratic equations obtained by taking (A2) and (A3), 
respectively, as equalities. That is,  2 ] ) 2 ( 1 [ 1





























2 ] ) 2 ( 1 [ 1
_ c c r c a − − − − = , with a
-<b
-. Taking into account that 
m
H q c r b 1 1
_ 2 ) 1 ( ≡ − − < , the period  1 outputs which form part of the separating 
equilibrium of minimum cost are  2 ] ) 2 ( 1 [ 1 1 c c r q
s
H − − − =  for the high-cost 
licensee and  2 ) 1 ( 1 1 r q
s
L − =  for the low-cost licensee. Given these outputs, the 
patent holder sets the period 1 royalty r1 to maximize its revenue from granting 
a license in this period—i.e. 
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 (A4) 
Finally, solving the first-order condition of problem (A4) enables 
] ) 2 ( )[ 1 ( 1 c c c r − − − = μ , which is negative, since c<1. Given the concavity of the 
objective function of the problem (A4), the best the patent holder can do is 
setting a zero royalty rate. Conditions (A1), (A2) and (A3) then become 
2
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≥ − − ,      ( A 7 )  
respectively. Conditions (A6) and (A7), considered as equalities, have roots 
given by  2 ] ) 2 ( 1 [ 1 c c q
s
H − ± =  and  2 ] ) 2 ( 1 [ 1 c c c q
s
H − ± − = , respectively. Thus, both 
conditions (A6) and (A7) are simultaneously satisfied by any output  ] , [
_ _
1 z v q
s
H ∈ , 
where  2 ] ) 2 ( 1 [
_ c c c v − − − =  and  2 ] ) 2 ( 1 [
_ c c z − − = , being that 





























account that  2 ] ) 2 ( 1 [
_ c c z − − = <
m
H q c 1 2 ) 1 ( ≡ − , the period 1 outputs forming part of 









L q q 1 1 =  for the low-cost firm. This completes the proof of the 
proposition. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: The difference between the period 1 licensing income 
the patent holder reaps under a screening contract, 
PH
scr Π , and that obtained 
under a signaling contract, 
PH
sig Π , amounts to 
) 1 ( 4







− − − − − − − − −
= −
c c c c c c c
c . (A8) 
The sign of (A8) depends on the sign of the numerator. This expression, which 
can be rewritten as  ] ) 2 ( 1 [ 2 ] ) 2 ( 4 7 [ ] ) 2 ( 2 5 [
2 c c c c c c c − − + − − − − − − μ μ , is a 
second-degree and convex function of μ, whose roots are 
] ) 2 ( 2 5 [ 2
] ) 2 ( 8 14 [ 9 ) 2 ( 4 7
c c
c c c c c c c
− −
− − − − ± − − −
= μ .    (A9) 
The highest root of the two given in (A9), however, verifies that 
c
c c
c c c c c c c
− >
− −
− − − − + − − −
1
] ) 2 ( 2 5 [ 2
] ) 2 ( 8 14 [ 9 ) 2 ( 4 7
.    (A10) 
Hence, it is not compatible with Assumption 1. Thus, the only relevant root is 
the lowest one, and expression (A8) becomes positive as long as 
] ) 2 ( 2 5 [ 2
] ) 2 ( 8 14 [ 9 ) 2 ( 4 7
c c
c c c c c c c
− −
− − − − − − − −
< μ .    (A11) 
In this case, the patent holder obtains higher income in period 1 under a 





























(A11) is fulfilled in the opposite sense, signaling is then superior to screening. 
This completes the proof of the proposition. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: Under a screening contract, the expected welfare in 
period 1 amounts to 





























μ μ  

















































































μ    ( A 1 2 )  
and under a signaling contract, it amounts to 
   
                           
PH
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(A13)                         
Comparison of (A12) and (A13) yields 
] ) 2 ( ) 1 )( 1 2 ( 2 ) 1 ( 2 ) 2 2 ( [ Sign  ) ( Sign 
2 2 2
sig scr c c c c c W W − − − − − − − − = − μ μ μ μ μ  (A14) 
and solving the equation 
0 ) 2 ( ) 1 )( 1 2 ( 2 ) 1 ( 2 ) 2 2 (





























yields the roots: c=0, 
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= c , 
2
4 3 2 2
17 26 10
13 48 66 40 9 9 16 7
μ μ
μ μ μ μ μ μ
+ −
+ − + − − + −
= c , and 
2
4 3 2 2
17 26 10
13 48 66 40 9 9 16 7
μ μ
μ μ μ μ μ μ
+ −
+ − + − + + −
= c . The proof of the proposition is 
completed by inspection of these roots. 
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